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A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the
Criminal Choice
By M. K.

BLOCK AND

"Much of the security of person and
property in modern nations is the effect
of manners and opinion rather than

J.

M.

REINEKE*

The commission of most offenses results
in an expenditure of effort, the possibility
of an increase in the individual's wealth
position, and the possibility of a penalty.
Aside from the penalty, the similarity between such offense decisions and labor
supply decisions under uncertainty is obvious.2 Moreover, if the penalty is a monetary payment, the analogy is precise.
Although many criminal choice problems may be viewed within an expanded
labor choice framework, care must be
exercised if these problems are to be interpreted in terms of strictly monetary costs
and benefits. We show below that by not
fully specifying their choice problems, and
therefore the transformation between what
is inherently a multiattribute decision
problem and the wealth-only problem,
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist are led to
conclusions which are valid only in very
special cases. In general, we show that
plausible preference restrictions are not
sufficient to generate unambiguous supply
results, a result that should come as no
surprise since it is the same situation that
confronts the investigator in most house-

law."
John Stuart Mill
Principles of Political Economy

Recently, a number of economists have
applied modern choice theory to the study
of illegal or criminal activities. Almost
without exception, they have emphasized
the similarity between the decision to
commit an offense and the traditional
household choice problem. As Gary Becker
in his pioneering article expresses the
proposition: "Some persons become 'criminals' ... not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons,
but because their benefits and costs differ"
(p. 176). Although this point is well taken,
we find that a number of recent contributions do not provide an adequate framework for analyzing the costs and benefits
of an important class of illegal activities.
In particular, Becker, Isaac Ehrlich, and
David Sjoquist summarize the consequences of time-consuming illegal activities in terms of a distribution on wealth
alone without fully considering the underlying multiattribute choice problem. 1

"labor" may be a relatively insignificant input. If this
is the case, modeling the decision problem as a choice
over wealth orderings is appropriate. However, for the
criminal choice in general, the labor attribute will be
significant and must be included in the agent's preference orderings. For this reason, most of our attention
will be focused on the papers of Becker, Ehrlich, and
Sjoquist who model the general criminal choice problem. Allingham and Sandmo are aware that several
attributes must in general be included in the individual's
decision problem and examine certain aspects of this
problem in one section of their paper.
2 See the authors (1973a) for an analysis of the labor
supply decision when returns are stochastic.

* Associate

professors of economics, Naval Post·
graduate School and University of Santa Clara, respectively. \Ve are indebted to James Sweeney, Hayne
Leland, Agnar Sandmo, and Henry Demmert for their
comments and suggestions. Tn addition, we would like to
acknowledge the comments of a referee which have been
most helpful in clarifying several portions of our argument. An earlier version of this paper was read at the
European Meetings of the Econometric Society 1973.
1 Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, SergeChristophe Kolm, and Balbir Singh also have papers on
the criminal choice problem. But each of these papers is
concerned with income tax evasion, an activity in which
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hold allocation problems. 3 Therefore, policy prescriptions in this area, as in the tax
incentive area, do not follow from theory
but rather require empirical determination
of relative magnitudes.
We proceed as follows: First, the individual's labor-offense supply problem is
formulated in terms of the underlying
multiattributed nature of the problem.
Next, supply responses to various parameter shifts are investigated. As would be
expected, under "usual" preference restrictions these responses are ambiguous in
sign. Finally, since unambiguous results
have been reported in the literature, the
last section and the Appendix are devoted
to determining the conditions under which
unequivocal supply effects obtain.

Note that the penalty for an offense is
specified as a fine. This penalty specification enables us to focus on an issue of
central concern in this paper, the role of
psychic costs in the offense decision. 5

I. The Joint Supply of Labor and Offenses

A. The Model

In the analysis which follows we restrict
our attention to property crimes, which
enables us to concentrate on what George
Stigler refers to as "production offenses."
Specifically, we consider an individual who
is confronted with two wealth generating
activities, legal activity (labor) and illegal
activity (theft) and denote the time spent
in these activities as LandT, respectively.
Hence, the individual's evaluation of his
well-being at any point in time will be a
function of the time spent generating
wealth and the level of his wealth, i.e.,

According to the expected utility theorem, the individual's labor-theft supply
decision is determined by

(1)

U

=

U(L, T, W)

where U is the agent's von NeumannMorgenstern utility indicator, and W represents wealth, with Uw>O, UL<O, and
UT<O. By including the arguments Land
T explicitly in U, we are provided with a
straightforward means of analyzing the
role of moral and ethical considerations
which may constrain the work-theft decision.
3 In particular, the agent's simple behavior toward
risk contains qualitative supply implications only in
highly restrictive circumstances.

The following definitions will be used:

r= the rate of return to legal activity
V = the rate of return to illegal activity
a= the stochastic failure, capture, or
arrest rate, 0 ~a~ 1
0= the number of offenses,
O=O(T) andO'(T)>O
F= the fine per offense
TV= W 0+rL+(V -aF)O(T),
actual wealth 4
N=time devoted to nonmarket activity
t=L+T+N

(2)

max
L,T

f

+ rL
+ (V -

U[L, T, W 0

aF)O]f(a)da

subject to the condition that labor and
theft levels be nonnegative. In (2), J(a) is
the agent's subjective probability density
on the arrest rate and indicates the agent's
beliefs as to the intervals in which the
arrest rate is likely to lie. To facilitate
comparison to the existing literature, we
adopt the specification used in Ehrlich,
Sjoquist, and Morgan Reynolds and fix
4 \Ve use the term "actual wealth" to denote the
wealth that an individual has available to meet financial
obligations. It is initial wealth W 0 plus earnil}gs or
losses during the period under consideration; W is a
particular value of W.
5 While the introduction of a prison sentence would
complicate the analysis, it would not invalidate the
basic argument which follows. In addition, according
to Becker, pp. 193-98, fines are not only the most common form of punishment, but also the most "efficient."
For an analysis in which prison sentences are formally
introduced into the choice problem, see Block and
Robert Lind.
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the amount of time allocated to nonmarket
activities. 6 Further, the number of offenses
is assumed to be proportional to the time
devoted to their production. Under these
assumptions the first-order condition for a
relative maxima requires that
(3)

E[UT- UL

+ Uw((V- aF)O'- r)] :::=:; 0

where (}'=-d(}jdT. As would be expected,
when the psychic cost of effort is afforded
its traditional labor theoretic role, the
agent's simple behavior toward risk (sign
U ww) has no unique allocative implications.7 Hence, Ehrlich's assertion, p. 528,
that preferences toward risk and relative
returns alone determine the degree of
specialization will not hold in general.
Only in a special case where "returns"
include a strong assumption concerning
psychic costs is such a statement valid. 8
In general, the time allocation between
L and T will depend not only upon the
agent's behavior toward risk and relative
returns but also upon the relative "irksomeness" of alternative occupations.
By way of illustration, consider an individual for which U L - U T > 0 for all L,
T, and W. We might say such an individual has a preference for honesty. If he
is also risk averse, then a necessary but
s That is, N =N, a constant.
7 Notice that although only first derivatives of U
appear in (3), a necessary condition for signing the
term EUw(V-aF) is knowledge of sign[Uww]. To see
this note that EUw(V-aF)=Cov(Uw, V-aF)+
E(Uw)E(V -a F) and that sign [Cov(Uw, V -aF)] depends upon how Uw changes with changes in V -aF (on
the average). To illustrate, consider an increase in the
value of a (a decrease in V- aF). Now decreases in
V -aF cause decreases in TV which in turn cause Uw to
either increase or decrease depending upon whether
Uww is negative or positive. So if Uww<O then decreases in V- aF cause increases in U w and U w and
V -aF move in opposite directions on the average, i.e.,
Cov(Uw, V-aF)<O. Similar arguments show Uww>O
implies Cov(Uw, V-aF)>O and Uww=O implies
Cov(Uw, V-aF)=O. In general a necessary but not
sufficient condition for signing product expectations
containing unrestricted random variables is sign knowledge on derivatives of one higher order than those appearing in the expectation.
s This point is discussed in more detail below.
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not sufficient condition for T>O is that
the returns to illegal activity be greater
than expected costs (where costs consist of
the average penalty plus legal opportunities foregone). For this condition to also
be sufficient for T>O, returns must be
sufficiently high to outweigh the psychic
disadvantage of participation in illegal
acts. In addition, increasing the certainty
of arrest, increasing penalties, or increasing
legal opportunities until "crime does not
pay," (V-E(a)F)(}'-r<O, will deter this
group of offenders. On the other hand, if
the individual displays both a preference
for risk and honesty, making "crime not
pay" may not deter participation. 9
II. Supply Behavior and Policy Changes 10

In this section, we pose a number of
questions concerning the supply behavior
of a single economic agent. In particular,
we investigate the agent's supply response
to changes in (i) initial wealth, (ii) the
payoff to illegal activity, (iii) the arrest
rate, and (iv) the severity of punishment.
In most of the comparative static derivatives which follow, second derivatives
of U appear in product expectations. This
points up a well-known characteristic of
stochastic models, viz., that a qualitative
analysis of parameter shifts in these
models often requires third derivative
information concerning the agent's utility
indicatorY The customary method of
providing this information is to postulate
plausible hypotheses regarding the agent's
'Risk-averse individuals with a preference for illegal
activities, UL-UT<O, may not be deterred by making
crime not pay in this sense.
1o In the discussion that follows, we assume internal
solutions exist to first-order conditions.
11 This statement is an application of the principle
stated at the end of fn. 7. So, for example, a necessary
condition for signing the term EUww(V -a F)=
Cov(Uww, V -aF)+ E(Uww)I~(V- a F) which appears
in equation (4), is sign[aUww!a(V-aF) ]. That is,
sign[Cov(Uww, V-aF)] depends upon how Uww
changes as V -aF changes. Hence, sign[Uwww] is
needed.
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behavior toward risk as various arguments
of the utility indicator change. For example, the multiattribute analog of the
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion function, R= - U ww / U w, has been termed
the conditional (absolute) risk aversion
for wealth by Ralph Keeney. If the agent
becomes increasingly willing to accept a
wealth gamble of a given size as his wealth
increases, ceteris paribus, he is said to
display decreasing absolute risk aversion
in wealth (aR/aW <0), a hypothesis we
shall adopt. This restriction on the agent's
preferences has been widely utilized and
has led to many interesting results. 12
A. Wealth Effects

A question of considerable interest to
both criminologists and economists is the
effect on the level of criminal activity of
changes in the offender's "initial wealth."
For example, would increased welfare
payments have incentive or disincentive
effects on the supply of offenses? To investigate this question, differentiate (3)
\\'ith respect to W 0 • In which case
(4)

aTjaW 0

=

E[ULw- UTw

- Uww((V- aF)8'- r)]/FTT

where F=EU(L, T, W).
Clearly, knowledge of the individual's
simple behavior toward risk (sign Uww)
will not provide sufficient information to
deduce the inferiority (or perhaps normality) of illegal activity; nor for that matter,
will the combination of, say, risk aversion
and decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Only a priori considerations can sign
aT/aW 0 at this level of generality.
B. Payoff Effects

To our knowledge, most of the research
on illegal activities has focused directly on
deterrence, and hence payoff effects on the
12 See, for example, Sandmo (1970, 1971), Hayne
Leland (1968, 1972), Jan Mossin (1968a,b), and Block
and Reineke (1972, 1973a).
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supply of these activities have been largely
ignored. 13 This neglect appears even in
much of the recent economics of crime
literature. For example, although Becker
includes "net returns" in his formulation,
it is not central to his supply of offenses
analysis. Certainly, any analysis of property crimes must include an examination
of payoff effects as a matter of central
concern. To this end, write
(5)

aTjav = -

EUw8'/FTT

+ 8aTjawo

Equation (5) is the stochastic analog of the
familiar Slutsky expression and is composed of a substitution effect and a wealth
effect. Since F TT and ()' are negative and
positive, respectively, the substitution
term is positive. Hence, the direction of
the supply response will depend upon the
wealth effect. If theft is an inferior activity, no qualitative conclusions are forthcoming.14
Of course, this comes as no surprise.
Economists have long known that "price
effects" in household decision models are
ambiguous in sign. Without further preference information, the necessary condition
for a positive supply response is the normality (or wealth independence) of illegal
activity. Without this condition, the possibility that theft is a Giffen activity cannot
be dismissed.

C. Enforcement Effects
In the model being investigated in this
paper, uncertainty is introduced through
the enforcement variable a. The payoff and
penalty are both assumed to be known but
the frequency of penalty imposition (the
arrest rate) a is taken by the agent to be
a continuous random variable, 0:::; a:::; 1.
This specification is a generalization of the
13 See Clarence Schrag, pp. 2(}-113, for a brief survey
of the criminology literature in this area.
14 Of course this statement remains valid a fortiori if
the time allocation to nonmarket activities is endogenously determined.
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Bernoulli formulation used by Becker,
Ehrlich, and Sjoquist. (See the Appendix.)
The relation between the offense decision and changes in the degree of enforcement has been a topic of long-standing
::peculation. But because the arrest rate is
a random variable there is no unique interpretation of an increase in enforcement.
However, an intuitive approach is to consider changes in enforcement procedures
that increase the expected number of arrests but leave all other moments of j(a)
unaltered. That is, we consider a "pure"
increase in the arrest rate. This may be accomplished by replacing a in (3) with a+ o
where ois a mean altering, dispersion preserving parameter. Differentiating with
respect too and evaluating at o=O yields:
(6)

aTjaa = - F(aT;av)

As we have noted, without relative magnitude information, aTjaV is unambiguously signed only if aTjaW 0 ~0. Hence,
for this class of penalties, we are able to
assert unequivocally the deterrent effect of
increases in the arrest rate (aTjao <0) only
by assuming the normality (or wealth independence) of illegal activity.
D. Penalty Effects
In the past decade we have witnessed a
heated polemic concerning the effects of
changes in the severity of punishment on
the crime rate. Protagonists of the "liberal" position have often claimed that
increasing the severity of punishment has
little or no deterrent effect on the supply
of offenses, while more "conservative"
individuals have denounced this group as
"soft on crime" and recommended increased penalties to combat growing crime
rates. Although much of this argument has
been couched in ideological considerations,
the central question concerning the supply
effects of changes in the severity of punishment is a major concern of policy makers. We now consider this question in the

JUNE 1975

context of the present model.
The first-order conditions (3) indicate
that the net rate of return to theft, the
individual's behavior toward risk, and his
"ethics," jointly determine the offense
level. Hence, by examining (3) one can
find several combinations of ethics and
behavior toward risk which would result
in zero offenses for sufficiently severe
penalties. For example, if the world were
comprised of risk-averse individuals who
display honesty preference, ( U L- U T) > 0,
then the supply of offenses could be driven
to zero by making F sufficiently large. 15
However, this is not likely to be possible,
and if not, the question of the supply response to a change in the severity of the
penalty must be formulated in terms of
marginal changes in the penalty.
Since F is deterministic in the present
model, the interpretation of a change in the
penalty is straightforward. In fact, increases in F act as scale changes on the
random variable a, decreasing expected
returns and increasing the dispersion of
returns. Formally,
(7)

aTjaF

=

E(Uwa)fJ'/FTT

+ fJE\a[UTw- ULw+ Uww
·((V- aF)fJ'- r)]}/FTT

Inspection of (7) reveals the substitution effect of a change in penalty to be
negative and the wealth effect to be unsigned without further preference information. Hence, at least at the present level
of generality, arguments alleging the disincentive effects of increases in the severity of punishment are not unambiguously
supported by theory.
We have seen that if the multiattributed
nature of the individual's decision problem
is fully accounted for, then the "usual"
preference restrictions concerning the individual's behavior toward risk will not
15 See Block and TJind for a discussion of the limits of
the criminal sanction.
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provide sufficient information to sign the
supply effects of increased "payoffs,"
"enforcement," and "penalties." The core
of the problem is of course the fact that
wealth effects are unsigned. And, assuming
theft to be an inferior activity does not
alleviate the ambiguity, since relative magnitude difficulties then arise in each case.
III. Ethical Costs and Wealth:
The Case of Independence

Up to this point, we have analyzed the
offense decision as a generalized labor
supply problem. As we have seen, the
price of this generality is qualitative ambiguity.16 In particular, the unambiguous
results reported by Becker, Ehrlich, and
Sjoquist are not forthcoming when the
offense decision is analyzed as a general
multiattribute decision problem. 17 An interesting question thus arises. What assumptions concerning the agent's utility
function are implicit in the several unambiguous results reported by these
authors? Or more generally, given the
supply problem posed in (2), under what
conditions do changes in the various components of the return to illegal activity
lead to unambiguous supply responses?
It is to this question that we now turn.
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist have
analyzed the criminal choice using a special
form of (2) in which all costs and benefits
associated with criminal activity have
been expressed in terms of wealth alone.
That is, in their models L and T do not
enter the utility function directly as attributes, but rather affect the level of util1' Again, this ambiguity persists a fortiori if the time
allocated to nonmarket activities is not fixed.
17 The only exception to this statement is the response
of offenses to a change in a when f(a) is Bernoulli, a result reported by all three authors. Although this result
does hold after the multiattributed structure of the
problem is incorporated into the model, it holds only
because the arrest rate is assumed to he Bernoulli distributed. Some of the implications of assumingj(a) to be
Bernoulli are discussed in the Appendix.

ity indirectly through their effects on
wealth. For example, Becker writes, costs
" ... can be made comparable by converting them into their monetary equivalent ... " (p. 179), while Ehrlich defines
the individual's wealth so that it includes
" ... assets, earnings within the period
and the 'real wealth' equivalent of nonpecuniary returns from legitimate and
illegitimate activity ... " (p. 525). Or, in
the words of Sjoquist: "The psychic gain
is measured by that quantity of money
which the individual is willing to pay to
obtain the psychic gain" (p. 439). To
contrast the present model with the work
of these authors, we reformulate the above
problem and express the psychic cost of
L and T in terms of their wealth equivalents.
Formally, the problem posed in (2) may
be reduced to an equivalent single attribute problem by defining a level of
wealth W* such that U(L, T, TV)= U(O,
0, W*). Clearly, W- W* is the wealth
equivalent of L hours of legal activity and
T hours of illegal activity. 18 In general, the
wealth equivalent will be a function, say
C, of L, T, an d W; 1.e., 19
0

A

W - W*

(8)

=

C(L, T, W)

Using (8), we may write
(9)

U(L, T, W) -

U(O, 0,

W-

C(L, T, W))

ts A case in which the wealth equivalent of T hours
of illegal activity does not exist occurs when (aW;aT)uo
fails to exist for all L, T, and W. An individual possessing such an ethic might he said to he absolutely honest.
In this case, one has a family of utility indicators parametric on T which are lexicographically ordered by T.
Formally, let va(Ta, L, W) represent a family of utility
indicators parametric on Ta, where OI<A, an index set.
Then absolute honesty implies Va0 > va• iff Ta0 <Ta*,
for all L and W. The set {va}, mA, is only partially
lexicographically ordered since if Ta0 =Ta*, then
Va0 va• depending upon the values of Land W.
19 A unique wealth equivalent exists (and hence the
function C) iff UL, UT, and Uw are continuous, monotonic functions of their arguments and Uw>O everywhere.

<
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One can analyze the choice problem at
hand in terms of either the right-hand or
left-hand side of (9). On the right-hand
side the attributes L and T have been
collapsed into their wealth equivalents,
leaving the single attribute utility indicator, U(O, 0, W*). For brevity, we define
U(O, 0, W*) = U(W*). Of course, nothing
has been changed since the individual's
orderings over the single attribute
Tf1 - C(L, T, TV) are equivalent to his
orderings over the attributes L, T, TV 20
Kote that the single attribute formulation
treats psychic costs (benefits) as a simple
subtraction (addition) from (to) wealth
and hence, is the analytic justification for
the approach adopted by Becker, Ehrlich,
and Sjoquist in which psychic costs and
returns are reduced to their monetary
equivalent and then combined with monetary returns and costs. Unfortunately,
none of these authors has derived his
model from the underlying multiattributed structure of preferences, with the
consequence that the results reported in
each paper are valid only for a special
case. In terms of the utility indicator
U(TV- C(L, T, TV)), their special case is
equivalent to assuming the function C is
independent of wealth, i.e., C= C(L, T)
or Cw=0. 21 \Ve now turn our attention to
several implications of this assumption.
A. Wealth E.ffects (Cw=O)

As we have seen, traditional restrictions
on preference orderings are insufficient to
establish the effect of changes in initial
wealth on the allocation of time to criminal
activities. Hence the supply effects of
changes in the payoff to illegal activity,
2 ° For a detailed discussion of wealth erJuivalence,
see Block and Heinekc (1973h).
21 For example, Ehrlich's equations (1.2) and (1.3),
p. 525, and Sjoquist's equations (2) an<l (-1-), p. 4-1-1, all
imply that the psychic costs and benefits of both legal
and illegal activity are independent of wealth. For a
more detailed discussion of this point, see Block and
Reineke (1974).
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the degree of enforcement, and the severity of punishment are unsigned. However,
if attention is focused on the special case
analyzed by Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist,
in which the monetary equivalent of the
psychic cost of legal and illegal activity C
is independent of wealth, then the wealth
effect is signed and likewise are the effects
of changes in the payoff, enforcement, and
punishment. To see this we reformulate
the supply problem given in (2) by replacing U(L, T, TV) with U(TV -C(L,
T)). 22 In which case equation (4) becomes
(4')

aTjaW 0 =

- EUww[(V- aF)&'
- r

+ CL- CT]/HTT

where H=EU(TV -C(L, T)).
As is obvious, the agent's simple behavior toward risk (sign Uww) provides sufficient information for signing (4') only in
the trivial case of risk neutrality, in which
case the individual's time allocation to
theft is invariant to changes in W 0 • Generally, third derivative information will
be needed. 23 If the individual is risk averse,
the Arrow-Pratt measure provides the
needed information. It can be shown that
if this measure decreases in wealth
(aR/aW <0), then the numerator of (-l')
is negative. 24 The crucial requirement,
which is absent in the general case where
C=C(L, T, Tl1 ), is that the non-linear portion of the wealth constraint be nonrandom. This is precisely the effect of making
C independent of wealth. \Ve now have
(10)

aT;awo > o

If the pyschic costs of effort are independent of wealth, and if the agent exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
22 To simplify notation in what follows, Uw will be
used to represent dU(ll'*)/dW*.
23 See fnn. 11 and 7 for a discussion of this point.
24 For prouf of a formally· identical preposition, see
Sandmo's (1971, pp. 68-69) demonstration of the negative output effects associated with changes in fixed costs.
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effort expended generating income via
illegal activity will increase with wealth.
In other words, given the widely employed
and currently unrefuted hypothesis of
decreasing absolute risk aversion, the
Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist specifications imply theft is a normal activity. 25
We now briefly reexamine the other
supply effects reported above for the case
where C and W are independent.
B. Payoff Effects (Cw= 0)
For the case at hand, equation (5)
above becomes
(5')

aT;av

=

-

EUwO'/HTT

+ eaTjawo

The substitution effect in (5') is positive
and as we have seen under the ArrowPratt hypothesis the wealth effect is also
positive. Hence, if psychic costs are invariant in wealth and if absolute risk
aversion decreases in wealth, then the
agent will unambiguously devote more
hours to illegal activity as the return to
these activities increases.
C. Enforcement Effects (Cw=O)
Derivative (6) above is of course still
(6')

aTjao

=

-

F(aTjaV)

where o is the mean altering, dispersion
preserving, additive shift parameter on
the random variable a. But as has been
noted, with C w= 0 decreasing absolute
risk a version implies aT/ aV> 0 and therefore increases in the arrest rate will produce an unambiguous deterrent effect on
the supply of offenses.

(7')

321

aTjaF = E(Uwa)O'/HTT

+ OE[Uww((V- aF)O'- r
+ CL- CT)a]/HTT
Since U w and a are each nonnegative
random variables, the first term in this expression is negative. In addition, it is
easy to show that decreasing absolute risk
aversion implies the numerator of the
second term is positive. 26 Therefore, both
terms are negative and we have the result
reported by Becker, p. 177, Ehrlich, p.
529, and Sjoquist, p. 441: Increases in
"punishment" unequivocally reduce the
incentive to engage in illegal activities.
Again the independence of psychic costs
and wealth implicit in the Becker, Ehrlich,
and Sjoquist models eliminates the ambiguity reported for the general case.

E. Pure Dispersion Changes
We now turn our attention to an additional and very interesting parameter
shift, a shift discussed by Becker, Ehrlich,
and Kolm.
The relation between the offense decision and the degree of certainty with
which the penalty is administered has been
deb a ted endlessly by criminologists. Well
over a century and a half ago, Sir Samuel
Romilly, in a series of debates with
William Paley, held that not only did certainty of punishment deter criminal activities, but also that certainty of punishment was more crucial then severity.
"So evident is the truth of this maxim that
if it were possible that punishment could
26To

see this, let

Z=(V-aF)8'-r+C~,-CT

and let

W 0 he that wealth level such that Z=O. We must show

D. Penalty Effects (Cw=O)
When Cw=O, the penalty effect reported in equation (7) becomes
25 Since the time allocations to income generating
activities is fixed, i.e., N = N, inequality (10) implies

aL;aw•<o.

R(UwwZa) >0. If Z>O then aR< (aR)o where (aR)o
signifies that the product aR is evaluated at Wo and
hence is nonrandom. Therefore, -ZaUww<(aR)oUwZ.
If Z <0 the analogous argument yields the same result.
Hence, - E(UwwZa) < (aR)oflCUwZ). But E(UwZ) is
the necessary condition for an internal maximum and
must he zero. Therefore, F.(UwwZa) >0. Note that if
(a) is Bernoulli, risk a version alone signs (7'). See the
Appendix.
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be reduced to an absolute certainty, a
very slight penalty would be sufficient to
deter almost every species of crime .... "27
\Ve next determine whether the present
model contains any implications concerning the deterrent effects of increases in the
certainty of punishment.
A widely utilized method of studying
the effects of changes in the dispersion of
a random variable consists of using a combination of a multiplicative and an additive parameter shift on the variable in
The
multiplicative
shift
question.
"spreads" the density, while the additive
shift is used to keep the mean of the variable unchanged. 28 To assess the supply
effects of a change in the dispersion of
punishment, we apply the additive shift
parameter to a, say "(, which in turn acts
as a multiplicative shift on F. The parameter 'Y is restricted to ensure E( aF) is
unchanged. 29 It is interesting to note that
dispersion changes generated in this manner are formally identical to the changes
in the probability of arrest "compensated" by changes in the penalty reported
by Becker, p. 178, Ehrlich, p. 530, and
Kolm, p. 266. 30
Differentiating the right-hand side of
(9) first with respect to T, then with respect to 'Y and evaluating the result at
"(= 0, we have31
(11)

aTja'Y

= -

(F/E(a)) { Cov (Uw, a)O'

+ 0 Cov [Uww((V- aF)O'
- r + CL- CT), a]} /HTT
Unlike the other comparative static re27 This debate is reported in Jerome Michael and
Herbert Wechsler, p. 250ff.
28 For example, see Sandmo (1970, 1971), Leland
(1972), and Block and Reineke (1973a).
29 Formally, dF:(a+r)F/dr=O and hence dF/dr=
-F/R(a) whenr=O.
30 This point is also noted in Brown and Reynolds,
pp. 512-13. See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion.
31 Of course, Cw=O in this derivative. If not, there is
no possibility of extracting qualitative information.
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suits reported in this section, decreasing
absolute risk aversion will not be sufficient
to sign (11). For risk-averse agents Cov
( U w, a) is positive, but nonlinearities in
"ethical costs" C L - C T, prevent further
analysis of the second covariance term.
It would seem that this term can be
signed only if the function C(L, T) is linear. An individual for which this condition holds might be said to display ethical
independence, 32 in which case it can be
shown that oR/oW <0 implies the second
covariance m (11) is positive and therefore33
(12)

aTfh

>o

Given the preference restrictions which
have been enumerated, the model supports the hypothesis that increases in the
certainty of punishment will induce disincentive effects. However, this seemingly
very plausible result that increases in the
certainty of punishment will discourage
criminal activity, a hypothesis often accepted as fact, rests upon the assumptions
that psychic costs are independent of
wealth and that the criminal choice problem is characterized by what Arrow has
32 Formally, if U=U(L, T, W), K is a constant and
(oW /oT)uo- (oW /oL)uo= K, L, T, W20, the indi-

vidual is ethically independent. Agents whose orderings
display ethical independence have the same relative
"taste (distaste) for crime" no matter what their
wealth may be and no matter how involved they might
he in legal and illegal activities. In other words, the
agent's ethical considerations are independent of both
his wealth and his participation rates in income generating activities. If K =0 in the definition, we might
say the individual is "ethically neutral." Ethically
neutral individuals find legal and illegal activity equally
distasteful and in effect combine them under the heading "work." These individuals probably most adequately represent the caricature of "economic man."
33 Define Z== (V -aF)O' -~·+CL-CT. We are to show
Cov (UwwZ,a) == E [UwwZ (a -val] >0. Note that
Z-p.z==(a-,..a)(-Fe') and hence R[UwwZ(a-p.a)]==
-Fe'E(UwwZ(Z-p.z) ]= -Fe'[RUwwZ'-p.zFUwwZ].
For risk-averse individuals RUwwZ'<O and if
oR/oW <0, then EUwwZ>O by (10) above. The only
remaining unsigned term is llZ· If the individual exhibits
ethical independence, the necessary condition for a
nonzero supply of offenses is p.z > 0. Therefore, the term
in brackets is negative and Cov(UwwZ, a) >0.
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called "constant stochastic returns." In
other words, the deterrent effect of "small"
increases in the certainty of punishment is
straightforward to establish only when
the criminal choice is modeled as a portfolio problem. Thus the results concerning
the certainty of punishment reported by
Becker, Ehrlich, and Kolm for the case
where j(a) is Bernoulli, are not forthcoming in the general case. 34
IV. Summary
We have examined in some detail the
individual's choice among two incomegenerating and time-consuming alternatives, one legal with certain returns and
one illegal with stochastic returns. Unlike
the existing literature in the area, this
problem was formulated in terms of the
underlying multiattributed structure of
preferences inherent in the decision problem. Utilizing this basic framework and
carefully specifying the relationship between the multiattribute problem and its
single attribute equivalent, we have shown
that the results obtained by previous authors are valid only in special cases. Most
significantly, changes in (i) wealth, (ii)
the payoff to illegal activity, (iii) enforcement, (iv) punishment, and (v) the degree
of certainty surrounding punishment were
seen to have no qualitative supply implications under traditional preference restrictions.
Simplifications which may appear to be
forthcoming in a "wealth only" model are
the result of a failure to fully specify the
transformation between the underlying
multiattribute model and its single attribute equivalent. Hence, in the area of law
enforcement as in taxation, policy recommendations do not follow from theory but

rather require empirical determination of
relative magnitudes.
APPENDIX

The Bernoulli as Subjectit•e Density

In the analysis above we assumed only the
existence of a subjective probability distribution j( a). This is a much more general approach than has been adopted in previous
work. Becker's pioneering work in the area
and the Ehrlich and Sjoquist extensions assume a is either 1 or 0 with j(1) = p and
j(O) = 1- p; i.e., j(a) is Bernoulli. This implies that the individual makes decisions
as if the only possible outcomes are total
failure or complete success, although it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which the
individual would be either caught for every
offense or not caught at all. This is in contrast
to the above formulation in which the "arrest
rate" may take on any value between 0 and
1 and hence the individual is confronted with
a continuum of failure possibilities. 35 He fails
on none, on all, or on any fraction of his attempted offenses. While both Ehrlich and
Becker seem to suggest that their results are
forthcoming for more general densities, as
the results above indicate, this is not the
case. 36
To see the implications of this density, define TV'== TV 0 +rL+(V -F)O and TV"== TV 0 +
rL+ VO and let f(a) be Bernoulli. In this
case,
(A1)

EU

= pU(L, T, TV')
+ (1- p)U(L, T, TV")

which in wealth equivalent form is
(A2)

EU=pU(TV'-C(L, T, Tl"))
+(1-p)U(TV"-C(L, T, TV"))

2\Jote that equation (A2) is the Ehrlich model
if C(L, T, TV) is not subsumed into V and
V-F.37
See Reineke for further discussion of this point.
For example, Ehrlich states, "Although our model
has been illustrated for two states of the world, the
analysis equally well applies to n states ... " (p. 528).
37 There does remain one minor difference between
the model in (A2) and the Ehrlich formulation. Ehrlich
allows for variable punishment by considering a punishment function F(O).
35

36

34 To interpret aT ja-y in terms of the Becker, Ehrlich,
and Kolm results, note that a is increased and F is decreased such that J':(aP) is constant. Since aTja-y>O,
the decrease in F has the greater effect on T. (See the
Appendix.)
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+
+

aTjay = { -Uw(W)[(VO'- r)(l- Cw(L, T, W'))
CL(L, T, W')- CT(L, T, W')]
Uw(!!')[(VO'- r)(l- Cw(L, T, W"))
CL(L, T, W")- CT(L, T, W")]
- FOUw(W)[CLw(L, T, W')- CTw(L, T, W')- Cww(L, T, W')((V- F)O'- r)]
- FOUww(W)(l- Cw(L, T, W'))(((V- F)O'- r)(l- Cw(L, T, W'))
CL(L, T, W')- CT(L, T, W')Jl/GTT

+

+

The essential elements of the preference
restrictions underpinning the Becker, Ehrlich,
and Sjoquist models may be seen by examining but one of the above supply effects: the
effect on illegal activity of a "compensated"
increase in the arrest rate. A compensated
increase in the arrest rate consists of an increase in the arrest rate compensated by a
decrease in the penalty, so that the effect of
both changes is to leave the expected punishment pF unchanged. While Becker and
Ehrlich employ equal and opposite percentage changes in p and F to accomplish this
compensated change, it may also be performed by simply setting
d(pF)/dp

= F

+ p(dF/dp)

= 0

and hence dF/ dp is equal to - F / p. This latter approach has the advantage of emphasizing the relationship between compensated changes in p and the more general
dispersion changes discussed above. Within
the Bernoulli framework, the Becker-Ehrlich
compensated change is a change in the dispersion of returns to illegal activity.
To proceed, note that
(A3)

aT;a'Y = aT;ap- (aTjaF)(F/p)

where 8T/8'Y is the effect on illegal activity
of a mean preserving (or compensated)
change in p, and aTjap and aTjaF are the
effects on T of changes in p and F, respectively. The individual's optimal level of illegal activity is obtained by maximizing
either (A1) or (A2). Since we are interested
in isolating the preference restrictions underpinning the Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist
results, it is most convenient to pose the decision problem in its wealth equivalent form,
(A2). To reduce the notation, define W = W'
-C(L, T, TF') and TV= W" -C(L, T, W").
Equation (A3) may now be written as
shown in equation (A4) where G= pU(W)
+(1-p)U(W). \Ve now note that in gen-

era!, and contrary to the assertions made
by both Becker, p. 178, and Ehrlich, p. 530,
simple behavior toward risk (sign U ww)
is not sufficient to establish the qualitative
effect of a compensated change in p. That
is, the sign of (A4) is not determined by
sign Uww-one also needs information on
the properties of the "cost" function C.
We now show that only in a special case is
it possible to infer the sign of (A4) from the
sign of U ww and also to infer the sign of U ww
from the sign of (A4) .38
To see this, consider the special case in
which ethical costs are independent of the
individual's wealth position, i.e., C(L, T, W)
= C(L, T). Under this condition (A4) may be
rewritten as follows:
(A4')

aT/a'Y
= ( [-

Uw(W)+Uw(W)J

· [(VO' -r)+Cr.(L, T)-CT(L, T)]
-FOUww(W) [((V -F)O'- r)

+Cr.(L, T)-CT(L, T)]l /GTT
Equation (A4') is the result obtained by
Ehrlich and is in fact identical to his expression for a compensated change in p except
for the fact that in (A4') ethical costs have
not been aggregated into "net" returns. 39
It is straightforward to show that the sign
of (A4') is uniquely determined by the sign
of Uww. 4 ° For example, if the individual is
38 ::Yfore precisely in the Becker, Ehrlich, and Sjoquist models, aTjay~O iff Uww50.
39 See Ehrlich, fn. 13, p. 530.
4 0To
see this, note that ((V-F)O'-r+CL(L,
T)-CT(L, T))<O and (VO'-r+CL(L, T)-CT(L,
T)) >0 by the first-order condition and GTT<O by the
second-order condition. Therefore the sign of the first
term on the right-hand side of (A-4') will be determined
by the sign of U ww. Since the sign of this term will be
opposite that of Vww, the sign of Uww uniquely determines the sign of (A-4'). In fact, with Cw = 0,
aTjay~O iff Uww50.
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risk averse (A4') will be positive and a compensated increase in the arrest rate will increase the individual's allocation to illegal
activities. In other words, under the condition that ethical costs are in de pendent of
wealth, a decrease in the dispersion of returns
to illegal activities will, when the density is
Bernoulli, unambiguously lead a risk-averse
(risk-preferring) individual to increase (decrease) his supply of such activities. Crucial
in this result is the specific density and the
independence of ethical costs and wealth. As
we have shown above, if the density is not
Bernoulli and/ or ethical costs are not independent of wealth, simple behavior toward
risk is not sufficient to establish the effect of
mean preserving dispersion changes.
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